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Abstract
The rise of populism in the West is often depicted as opposition to a “double
liberalism”, which is economic and cultural in tandem. In this optic, neoliberalism
and multiculturalism are allied under a common liberal regime that prescribes “open-
ness”, while populism rallies against both under the flag of “closure”. This paper
questions the central assumptions of this scenario: first, that neoliberalism and multi-
culturalism are allies; and, secondly, that populism is equally opposed to neoliberalism
and to multiculturalism. With respect to the alliance hypothesis, it is argued that only a
diluted version of multiculturalism, in terms of diversity and antidiscrimination, is
compatible with neoliberalism, which also needs to be sharply distinguished from
liberalism. With respect to the dual opposition hypothesis, it is argued that the
economic inequalities generated by neoliberalism may objectively condition populist
revolts, but that these inequalities are not centrally apprehended and addressed in their
programs; furthermore, it is argued that the rejection of multiculturalism indeed is
central to populist mobilization, but that the two have important things in common, not
least that both are variants of identity politics, if incompatible ones.
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It has often been overlooked that multiculturalism and neoliberalism are historical
twins. Both arrived jointly after the short moment in postwar Western history, ca.
1945–1975, when capitalism and democracy seemed happily reconciled in the tax-and-
spend welfare state and a surrounding Social Democratic consensus. Certainly, some
left-liberal critics of multiculturalism noticed from early on the simultaneous rise of
multiculturalism and neoliberalism, and they blamed the foregrounding of culture and
“recognition” for the loss of attention to socioeconomics and “redistribution”, whereby
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some classic statements, see Fraser 1995 and Barry 2000). But only contemporary
populism, which had its breakthrough in the West with the 2016 Brexit referendum and
the ascent of Trump, has brought this coincidence into full view. Interestingly, the new
vista opened up by the rise of populism is not only one of a happenstance constellation
between multiculturalism and neoliberalism, one force (multiculturalism) inadvertently
clearing the field for the other (neoliberalism) in a world of narrow attention spans, but
of a full-blown sociopolitical alliance between both. Nancy Fraser (2017) best expressed
this new perspective in her pithy notion of “progressive neoliberalism”, which in her
view was knocked-down by the “reactionary populism” of Donald Trump in 2016.
Indeed, a prominent academic account of contemporary populism inWestern Europe
and the United States is in terms of an opposition to a hegemonic “double liberalism”
(Koppetsch 2019:83; Koschorke 2018; Reckwitz 2017 and 2019), the “economic
liberalism” of neoliberals and the “cultural liberalism” of multiculturalists.1 In this view,
multiculturalism is not the oppositional or minority force as which it likes to depict itself
but pillar of the dominant political regime. In the most complete such analysis, German
social theorist Andreas Reckwitz (2019) sees neoliberalism and multiculturalism united
in terms of a “liberalism of openness” (apertistischer Liberalismus). Adhering to a post-
1970s “dynamization paradigm” (Dynamisierungparadigma), which has replaced the
“regulation paradigm” of Social Democracy, the new liberalism prescribes the “general
deregulation, dynamization and opening of previously fixed societal structures” (ibid.
262). As the Social Democratic left has dissipated in the transition, or its Third Way
remains have shifted sides toward the forces of opening and deregulation,2 the new
grand opposition to the liberal regime is right-wing populism, which pushes for national
re-regulation and closure, both with respect to economics and to culture (ibid. 280).
Hence we arrive at the prominent notion of a “new political divide” of “closed v. open”
having overlaid or even supplanted the old “right v. left” divide.3
Interestingly, populists see it much the same way. While speaking less in terms of
politics and ideology than of class and social structure, Alexander Gauland, leader of
the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), sees his own and other
populisms, be they right or left, as fundamental opposition to a “new urban elite” that
has gained strength after the end of the Cold War and in the course of globalization.4
For Gauland, the enemy is a “new class” constituted across sectors, of “people from
business, politics, and the entertainment and culture industry—above all the new
species of digital information workers”—the same group that is also central to
Reckwitz’s “cultural capitalism” analysis (2017, 2019). The shared feature of the
new class is to be highly educated, cosmopolitan and dissociated from their national
societies, easily switching jobs and habitat between Berlin, London and Singapore, and
they mingle in the same “social but culturally diverse milieu”. The “rain that falls in
their home countries does not make them wet”, the German populist memorably sums
1 Of course, not all understandings or conceptions of multiculturalism are liberal, and many liberals (most
acidly Barry 2000) have criticized multiculturalism precisely for being illiberal. For overviews of multicul-
turalism theories, “liberal“, “communitarian“, and “radical“, see Joppke (2017a:ch.2; 2020).
2 For a blasting critique of the neoliberalized left, based on the example of the US Democratic Party since the
early 1990s, see Frank (2016). With a focus on the US New Democrats` simultaneous pandering to minority
identity politics, see Lilla (2017).
3 “The new political divide”, The Economist, 30 July 2016, p.7.
4 Alexander Gauland, “Warum muss es Populismus sein?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 October 2018.
770 Theory and Society (2021) 50:769–790
up the privileged situation of the “globalist class”. The old left-right distinction is
deemed irrelevant in this constellation. The opposition to the globalist class, says
Gauland, a former Christian Democrat, “could be of the right or left, but populist it
has to be. To be populist means to be against the establishment”.5
The tale of the two liberalisms merged into one and of its populist
Fundamentalopposition, though shared by social theorists and populists alike, slights
important nuances, frictions, and incompatibilities of its constitutive elements and of
their linkages. To bring them to light is the purpose of this paper. In particular, I will
ask three questions. First, are multiculturalism and neoliberalism really allies, which is
the central claim of the “double liberalism” tale? Secondly, is populism really an
opposition to neoliberalism, the first plank of the stipulated double liberalism? And,
thirdly, is populism really an opposition to multiculturalism, which is this liberalism’s
second plank?
The point of this exercise is not to question the legitimacy of what in the German-
European tradition is called Gesellschaftstheorie, the macroscopic, diagnostic, and
often critical theory of entire societies, in whose context the tale of the two liberalisms
and of its populist opposition has been developed by Reckwitz and others. In
Reckwitz’s grand scenario (2017, 2019), the double liberalism tale is even only one,
the political element of a large-scale vision of “late modernity” as individualized
“society of singularities”, which is obsessed with the cultural production and “curation”
of the “singular individual”, and which has also other, socioeconomic and cultural
elements that are equally laid out in his theory. For such purpose, it must be allowed to
make bold statements at a high level of abstraction. The specialist will naturally object
that “populism”, “neoliberalism”, or “multiculturalism”, about each of which specific
and complex literatures have evolved across a variety of disciplines, are never the same
in any two places or points in time; and she will conclude that juxtaposing them as
holistic entities or even actors, writ large, as if each of them were one, is unduly
simplifying and wrong. In addition, what each of these paired entities is, is also
dependent on what other entity it is paired with, and what specific attributes of the
other are highlighted. The problem is that these specialist literatures (on populism,
neoliberalism, multiculturalism) are often not aware of one another, and it is precisely
the advantage of higher-level templates, like that of the “double liberalism” and its
forms of conflict, to bring them together and detect connections, but also inconsis-
tencies and problems in each, that one otherwise could not see. Accordingly, it is in the
spirit of refining, not of demolishing theoretical abstraction that this paper sets out
“exploring the links” between three central sociopolitical phenomena of our time.
Are multiculturalism and neoliberalism really allies?
If one holds the view that multiculturalism is a matter of extending liberal democracy to
minorities, the most pronounced and influential version of which is Kymlicka’s
acclaimed Multicultural citizenship (1995), it is a most improbable claim that multi-
culturalism and neoliberalism could ever be “allies”. Consider that, as economic policy,
neoliberalism had first been practiced by the Pinochet military dictatorship in Chile in
5 Ibid.
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the early 1970s. This points to the uncomfortable truth that, since its invention in the
pages of Friedrich Hayek, neoliberalism has been hostile to democracy. Neoliberalism
is liberalism minus democracy, and in this sense not “liberal” at all, if one follows
Stephen Holmes` (1995) compelling case, made with the help of the liberal classics,
that liberalism requires democracy.6 Alarmed by the democratic roots of early twentieth
century totalitarian rule, Hayek feared that democracy was a Trojan horse to destroy a
free market society, it opened up the “road to serfdom”, to quote the title of his most
famous work (Hayek 1944). Historian Adam Tooze is right that “neoliberalism is…an
anti-democratic politics, which resolves the tension between capitalism and democracy
either by limiting the range of democratic discretion or by interfering directly in the
democratic process” (quoted by Anderson 2019:90).
Neoliberalism’s breakthrough in Western core states was still by democratic means,
in terms of the election victories of Thatcher in the UK in 1979 and of Reagan in the US
in 1980. Neoliberalism is no capitalist conspiracy, as one might think when reading its
powerful indictments by Colin Crouch (2011) or Wolfgang Streeck (2013). Instead, it
has been installed and perpetuated by public acclamation, in the meantime also outside
its Anglo-Saxon homeland.7 Why the middle classes that mostly came to be harmed by
it voted for and continued to support neoliberalism, is an intriguing question that has
less often been asked than how capitalists deployed neoliberal precepts to reinstate their
class power after the three-decade-long “shotgun marriage” between capitalism and
democracy, post-WWII (Streeck 2016:2). An important part of the puzzle is that
through (modest) asset ownership, particularly home-owning, ordinary people acquired
a stake in the system. “Homevoters” are conservative, as Margaret Thatcher shrewdly
realized and exploited to her great advantage—the Tories` 1980 Housing Act allowed
one million council flats to be bought by their working-class and lower-middle-class
tenants well below market price, thus creating a “property-owning democracy” that
helped keep her in office over three consecutive elections (Mau 2015:62).
One sees, the one constant in the early political realization of neoliberalism is its
close association with the political right and with nationalism—for this period, Michael
Mann is right to see neoliberalism “only in alliance with a conservative revival”
(2013:130). For the element of nationalism, remember that Thatcher adorned her
neoliberal revamping of economy and state, according to which there “is no such thing
as society…and people have to look for themselves first”,8 with a throaty little war
against Argentine. In the United States, the advent of neoliberalism under Ronald
Reagan also saw the rise of the “neocons”, who combined an endorsement of unfettered
6 This is not to deny that there is a large literature, going back to (a conservative reading of) Tocqueville,
which stresses tensions between liberalism and democracy, to the degree that the first prioritizes “freedom“
while the second rallies around “equality“. For Judith Shklar, whose “liberalism of fear“ belongs to the
democracy-skeptical tradition, the relationship between liberalism and democracy is at best a “marriage of
convenience“ (1989:37).
7 For an unpersuasively narrow reading of “neoliberalism“, as economic policy limited to the “Anglophone
Countries“and “faltering“in the new millennium, see Mann (2013:ch.6). Without endorsing the hyperbole, I
find it more adequate to see neoliberalism as a new cross-sectoral governing rationale in a society of
“generalized social insecurity“ (Waquant 2005:4). This neoliberal governing rationale is pithily described
byWacquant (2012:66) as „an articulation of state, market and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the
stamp of the second onto the third“.
8 This line apparently was even recited at her funeral. See the post-mortem reflection by Samuel Brittan,
“Thatcher was right—there is no `society`”, Financial Times, 18 April 2013.
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capitalism with moral conservatism and the nationalist projection of American military
power abroad. The Marxist geographer David Harvey (2005:85) concluded that “the
neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive”. Also note that, on the
opposite side, the Thatcherite “link (of) unfettered market forces to a defense of
traditional institutions, particularly the family and the nation” implied the “severest
strictures for multiculturalism” (Giddens 1999:12), as documented in the Tories` attack
on the “loony left” and local council radicalism in the mid-1980s (see Joppke
1999:243–45).
However, there is little in the logic of neoliberalism that requires “traditional nation-
alism”, as Anthony Giddens (1999:12) called neoliberalism’s early political companion.
Certainly, the main link is neoliberalism’s contempt for democratic equality and factual
endorsement of inequality, of a natural sort of hierarchy that inevitably follows from the
unfettered pursuit of market freedoms. This is also the one justification to call neolib-
eralism “right” in political terms. On the other hand, Hayek (1982:111) rejected
“nationalism” as one of the “two greatest threats to a free civilization” (the other being
“socialism”), and his “liberal society”was unabashedly cosmopolitan. It notably implied
“conceding to the stranger and even the foreigner the same protection of rules of just
conduct which apply to the relations to the known members of one’s own small group”
(ibid. 88). Moreover, to “champion[] non-discrimination” (Genschel and Seelkopf
2015:239) is a core feature of the “competition state”, which is the most commonly
used name for the post-1970s neoliberal state—a state that “competes” for attracting
globally mobile capital and market actors. In its concise description by Philipp Genschel
and Laura Seekopf (ibid.), the competition state “is basically indifferent to race, religion,
income, or gender, and it welcomes social, cultural, and ethnic diversity as a productive
resource. Interest, not identity, keeps national society together.”
Neoliberalism’s cosmopolitan and nondiscriminatory edge makes it compatible with
a thin multiculturalism of diversity and antidiscrimination. In fact, some of the same
international organizations that have spread neoliberalism, like the World Bank, the
OECD, and the European Union, have also come around in favor of multiculturalism,
and not necessarily the diluted kind (see Kymlicka 2007). For instance, the World Bank
makes loans to third-world states conditional on their compliance with indigenous
rights; and the EU has included the respect for minority rights in its Copenhagen
Criteria that need to be fulfilled for joining the club. Of course, the true multiculturalist,
like Will Kymlicka, has no good thing to say about “neoliberal multiculturalism” that
provides “inclusion without solidarity” (2015:21), and that celebrates the “cosmopol-
itan market actor who can compete effectively across state boundaries” (2013:111)
while slighting justice concerns of minorities within national societies.
Whatever one thinks of it, “neoliberal multiculturalism” became politically possible
and amplified through the Third Way transformation of the political left. Epitomized by
Tony Blair’s Labour Party in the UK and Bill Clinton’s Democratic Party in the US, the
Third Way left embraced neoliberal globalization and multiculturalism in tandem. As
for neoliberalism, under Bill Clinton’s stewardship, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) was created in 1995 that opened the floodgate for what Dani Rodrik called
“hyperglobalization”, which is the subverting of democratically arrived standards of
health, environmental protection, or taxing and spending for the sake of global market
integration as “end in itself” (Rodrik 2011:76). And Clinton, in the appositely entitled
“Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act” (1996), ended
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“welfare as we know it”, initiating the turn to austere workfare that is a central element
of neoliberal social policy (for early overviews, see Gilbert 2002 and Handler 2004). As
for multiculturalism, Clinton famously praised his first cabinet as “look(ing) more like
America than any previous”, that is, including women and minorities—only forgetting
to mention that they were all elite-university graduates, like himself. Under his reign,
the Democratic Party gave in to the alliance of minority identity politics and Wall Street
that is the hallmark of “progressive neoliberalism” (Fraser 2017). Here is a vignette
from his wife Hillary’s progressive-neoliberal campaign in 2016: “`If we broke up the
big banks tomorrow`, she shouted, `would that end racism?` `No!` her audience replied.
`Would that end `sexism`? `No!` And on she went, razzing the crowd up with a pro-big
bank message couched as something very different” (Shaxson 2018: ch.5).
A similar story could be told about New Labour under Tony Blair. As for neolib-
eralism, Margaret Thatcher famously remarked that “her greatest achievement” was
“Tony Blair and New Labour. We forced our opponents to change their minds”.9 As for
multiculturalism, under the label of “Cool Britannia”, it became something like official
state policy during Blair’s first term in office, with the British Airways fleet repainted in
Rastafari colors, until the twin pincer of domestic race unrest and Islamist terrorism
moved the compass toward centrist “social cohesion” and “citizenship” during Blair’s
second term.
The epitome of the political left’s neoliberal conversion is the famous Schröder-Blair
Paper of June 1999, which also demonstrates neoliberalism’s growing cachet beyond
the Anglo-Saxon core countries. Reread 20 years later, in light of Social Democracy’s
near-extinction in the meantime, this paper exhibits an astoundingly naïve and drum-
ming commitment to “economic dynamization and the freeing of creativity and
innovation”, while assuming that this new goal could simply be added on to the classic
“social justice” agenda of the left, without any risk of incoherence or conflict. In reality,
whenever a justice-minded position of old is mentioned, it is in distorted and negative
form, as something to take distance from—“equality of results”, the state as “replace-
ment of the economy”, a “disproportionate expansion of administration and bureaucra-
cy”, “rights without duties”, “deficit spending” and the “steering of the economy to
create growth and employment”, the last two being the only non-distorted description
of a classic Social Democratic position: all this was to be dropped in favor of “own
effort and responsibility”, “a new entrepreneurial spirit at all levels of society”,
“flexibility”, and a new “supply-side agenda for the Left” that does not tolerate
“excessive state indebtedness”.10 Insisting that the “first priority must be investment
in human and social capital”,11 and that non-economic goals like environmental
protection are, of course, good for “open(ing) new markets and creat(ing) employ-
ment”, the Blair-Schröder paper reads like a caricature of “neoliberal rationality”, as
acidly dissected by Wendy Brown (2015). It embraces the economization of every-
thing, despite the hopeful and utterly misleading statement that the “two past decades of
neoliberal laisser-faire are over”.12
9 See https://economicsociology.org/2018/03/19/thatcherisms-greatest-achievement/.
10 Schröder-Blair Paper, “Der Weg nach vorne für Europas Sozialdemokraten”, 8 June 1999, London
(retrieved from http://www.glasnost.de/pol/schroederblair.html); at p.4.
11 Ibid., p.6.
12 Ibid., p.4.
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It is obvious that the “multiculturalism” added to this neoliberal agenda, in principle,
can only be of a diluted kind, deprived of its original impulse to provide justice to
minorities. This is patently visible in the concept of “diversity”, which is a widely used
and accepted follow-up term to “multiculturalism”, which has been discredited in many
places, especially in Europe (see Joppke 2017a:56–60). Two chroniclers think that
diversity is “the term now meant to do much of the work that `multiculturalism` used
to” (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009:28). While true at one level, this is also misleading
if one looks closer. Diversity first appeared as a legal term to repudiate an asymmetric,
substantive interpretation of American civil rights law, known as “affirmative action”,
which was to provide justice to historically wronged minority groups, above all the
descendants of African slaves. Instead, the new “diversity” idiom, first enunciated in
Justice Powell’s famous swing-vote opinion in the Supreme Court’s seminal Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke (1978) decision, couched American society in the
history-distorting colors of a symmetric “nation of minorities”.13 In this picture, even
the white “majority” is in reality composed of a variety of “minorities” that had suffered
at one point in time. Bakke incidentally saved a diluted form of affirmative action, as
not entailing quotas, but under its “diversity” rationale it is largely shorn of justice
elements.14 Instead, diversity is in the interest of sector-specific efficiency wherever it
may appear, from business to academia or the public sector at large—diversity “strad-
dles many worlds”, as Thomas Faist put it appositely (2009:173). In the corporate
world, for instance, diversity quickly became a dominant management philosophy, led
by the diction that “a more diverse workforce will…bring greater access to new
segments of the marketplace” (Kelly and Dobbin 1998:962).
Closely connected to diversity, antidiscrimination is a second angle for a justice-
deprived, thin version of multiculturalism to become allied with neoliberalism. The
relationship between multiculturalism and antidiscrimination is complex. If antidis-
crimination is substantively understood as justice for minorities, it is fully compatible
with, even springs from a classic multicultural agenda—however, outside of Canada,
this is not the dominant legal understanding of antidiscrimination today (see Joppke
2021). The original impetus of the mother of all antidiscrimination laws, which is the
1960s US civil rights laws, was indeed to restore justice to the historical victim groups
of American nation-building, above all blacks. Though arising and mostly operating in
a different sector, higher education, American multiculturalism had the exact same
impetus (see Glazer 1997; for the early convergence of antidiscrimination and multi-
culturalism in the US, see also Joppke 1996:456–465). This is not denying the opposite
thrusts of antidiscrimination and multiculturalism: universalistic v. particularistic. In the
US, the project of antidiscrimination, at least in the original civil rights laws, is (or was)
to destroy race as a marker of discrimination; by contrast, the project of multicultural-
ism, from the beginning and up to its latest incarnations, was (or is) to acknowledge
race as a marker of identity. For a while, both met in the middle, in terms of affirmative
action, which is a radicalized, necessarily group-recognizing and thus “multicultural”
13 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); at 292.
14 It must be conceded that the Supreme Court’s Bakke decision contains a whole welter of opinions, in some
of which—as in Chief Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, which was supported by three other justices—the
justice element is still prominent: “Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult
any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice” (ibid., at 325). I owe
this qualification to Rogers Brubaker.
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variant of fighting discrimination. Heavily embattled since the late 1970s, because of
the “reverse discrimination” that it entails for the non-victim group, whites, affirmative
action has been reduced to the consideration of “diversity” as an optional “plus” factor,
as Justice Powell put it in Bakke (1978),15 among other factors, particularly in the
domain where it always mattered most: admission to university. In the process,
traceable, in the domain of higher education, in the evolving Supreme Court jurisdiction
from Bakke (1978) to Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Schuette v. Coalition v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action (2014), a formalistic and symmetric understanding of
antidiscrimination prevailed, which prohibits negative and positive classifications on the
basis of race (and other ascriptive markers), and which is not limited to historical victim
groups but includes whites. While this did not happen without a fight in the US,16 a
formalistic take on antidiscrimination never had a serious competitor in Europe,17 not
least because of the absence of a historical victim group analogous to American blacks,
which might have pushed antidiscrimination into a substantive justice direction.
The parallel between a formalistic and symmetric understanding of antidiscrimina-
tion and neoliberalism has never been explicitly drawn. However, to the degree that
neoliberalism is a shrunk “liberalism” that explicitly eschews social justice, as in Hayek
(1982), this parallel is too obvious to be overlooked.
If diversity and antidiscrimination are the main vehicles to build the alliance between
multiculturalism and neoliberalism, its “multiculturalism” part apparently has question-
able credentials. It is therefore all the more wondrous what mighty effects have been
attributed to multiculturalism in the “double liberalism” tale. For Andreas Reckwitz
(2019), the multiculturalist “left liberalism” and its “politics of subjective rights” has
done nothing less than fuel segregation and the rise of “parallel societies”. This bloated
charge is curiously similar to populist demonology. “The liberal politics of multicul-
turalism has contributed to the cultural disintegration of immigration societies”, it has
favored the “self-insulation of cultural communities on the basis of ethnicity and
religion”, argues Reckwitz (ibid. 273). Perhaps, an illiberal, group-mongering version
of multiculturalism, which does exist in activist circles but is nowhere official state
practice in the Western world, may lead to such an outcome. But to hold the “liberal
politics of multiculturalism” (ibid.), say, from the pages of Will Kymlicka (1995) or as
it is empirically practiced in Canada or Australia, responsible for such an imagined
15 Ibid., at 311 f.
16 For instance, in the domain of US employment law, starting with the federal court cases Garcia v. Gloor
(1980) and Rogers v. American Airlines (1981), there has been a movement to protect ethnic, racial, and later
also sexual-preference identities, and not only biologically fixed immutable markers, on the basis of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. But this movement has largely failed (see Joppke, 2017a:136–40; 2021). Its
failure in the legal domain is not to say that a substantive understanding of antidiscrimination has not been
persistently dominant at the level of activist claims-making, with considerable (if highly questionable, from a
liberal perspective) successes on American college campuses (in terms of free-speech restrictions in favor of
“vulnerable” minority groups, and many other debatable measures) (see the critical account by Lukianoff and
Haidt 2018). In the wake of the recent Black Lives Matter movement, but also of an increasingly viral LGBT
rights movement, a substantive understanding of antidiscrimination has become hegemonic in public-political
discourse, to the point that even moderate dissent is denounced as “racist” and “homophobic”. For a rather
alarmist argument that, in the US, this development should be grounded in the de facto “rival constitution” of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act that now “commands the near-unanimous endorsement of judicial elites and civic
educators”, see Caldwell 2020 (quoted at p.6).
17 A certain exception to this are women. See Joppke (2021), and also the helpful contrasting of the different
trajectories of antidiscrimination in Europe and the United States by De Búrca (2012).
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outcome (which “immigration society” is actually “culturally disintegrated”, and how
would we know?), is patently absurd. Relatedly, it is simply not correct to say that the
“liberal politics of subjective rights”, arguably the beating heart of liberal multicultur-
alism, “is helpless to work against the process of disintegration” (Reckwitz 2019:275).
Liberal law does have all the necessary tools to counteract “disintegration”, such as the
public order principle and its proportionality and balancing tests, according to which no
subjective right is ever absolute. A closer look into the evolving Islam file of European
high courts, allows no other conclusion (see Joppke and Torpey 2013). The equation of
a liberalism of subjective rights with extremer forms of multicultural identity politics,
and of both with cultural disintegration and the rise of “parallel societies”, is a canard
that should be put to rest.
Populism v. neoliberalism?
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the tale of the two liberalisms is that it sidesteps
a sterile controversy in the explanation of contemporary populism, with one strand
arguing in favor of an economic, and another in favor of a cultural explanation, as if the
two were not connected or complementary. An influential opinion survey of Inglehart
and Norris (2016), for instance, slices up the field this way—and then argues in favor of
a “cultural backlash” over an “economic have-not” explanation of populism. In reality,
both economics and culture matter as explanatory factors. This sounds trivial but needs
to be underscored. And, of course, politics matters, too, as a third, and perhaps crucial
dimension for any account of “populism” stricto sensu. This is because populism,
underneath its variegated expressions, left or right, socialist or nationalist, is always a
response to a presumed democracy deficit, juxtaposing an unaccountable and corrupt
“elite” and a homogenous and pristine “people” who notionally should rule in a
“democracy” but are heinously deprived of their constitutive power by unresponsive
and rent-seeking elites (the centrality of politics for any explanation of populism is the
important message of Pappas 2019).
With respect to the controversial economics v. culture distinction, both factors
matter but they matter in different ways. Growing economic inequality, which is a
signature feature of societies undergoing neoliberal globalization, functions more as an
objective background factor, operating a tergo by feeding a sense of stagnation and fear
of the future among large portions of the Western lower middle classes. By contrast, as
scores of analyses of the programs of populist radical right parties and of their
supporters` views have demonstrated, culture and way of life issues, the resurrection
of a denigrated “majority” against the onslaught by uppity “minorities”, tend to be
foregrounded. “(C)ulture has trumped economics as the singular feature of the radical
right”, argued one of the first (and still best) analyses of the fast-growing new family of
radical right parties in Europe (Art 2011:11). In his analysis of the “coming of age” of
populism, in terms of Brexit and Trump, David Goodhart (2017:2) agrees. He interprets
both as the result of “unhappy white working class voters (plagued) more by cultural
loss, related to immigration and ethnic change, than by economic calculation.” Note
that in the above quoted auto-analysis of German populist Gauland, the one word that
appears most often is “Heimat” (home), which is claimed by “ordinary people” as a
“value in itself”, above all against “immigrants” who “stream into their
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neighborhoods”: “They cannot just move away and play golf somewhere else”18 (unlike
The Donald, he might have added).
While the relationship between populism and democracy is contested, some finding
populism an expression of democracy (Canovan 1999 or Mény and Surel 2002) while
others see it as threat to democracy (Müller 2016), no single analysis has ever
questioned that populism is gutturally opposed to liberalism. “Democratic illiberalism”
thus is appositely the politics-centered “minimal definition” of populism proposed by
Takis Pappas (2019:35): “Populism is always democratic but never liberal”. Cas
Mudde (2004:561) concurs in a near-identical and widely influential description of
populism as “illiberal democracy”, which “rejects all limitations on the expression of
the general will, most notably the constitutional protection of minorities and the
independence…of key state institutions.”
However, how neoliberalism fits into this picture is much less clear. At the level of
theory and of policy alike, there is a compelling case for neoliberalism to be distinct
from liberalism. Certainly, both share the centrality of the individual and her liberties in
the constitution of social and political order. However, neoliberalism parts ways with
liberalism in its categorical denial of social justice. “Social justice”, as neoliberalism’s
chief theorist Friedrich Hayek (1982:99) put it dismissively, is “dislike of people who
are better off than oneself, or simply envy”. Hayek’s denial of social justice as task for
public policy is not part of the classical “liberal idea”, as masterfully retold by Stephen
Holmes, according to which there is a “fundamental continuity between liberal rights
and welfare rights” (1995:266). In lieu of social justice, neoliberalism advocates a
harshly individualistic understanding of “responsibility” and “responsibilization”,
which shows in post-welfarist “responsibility-tracking” social policies, like workfare
programs (see Mounk 2017: ch.2). In the terms of the canonic late-twentieth century
version of liberalism, by John Rawls (1971), neoliberalism condones “equal liberty”,
Rawls` first principle of justice, yes; but neoliberalism emphatically denies Rawls`
second justice principle, the “difference principle”, which tolerates inequality only to
the degree that it helps the worst-off in society, and thus is a case for redistribution to
further social justice.
In plain terms, neoliberalism advocates unfettered market freedoms, “market funda-
mentalism” as Block and Somers (2014) have called it, not in the words but in the spirit
of Karl Polanyi. Neoliberalism thus understood is not just an economic policy prevail-
ing in the “Anglos”, for a while, and not much elsewhere, as argued by Michal Mann
(2013: ch.6). Instead, it flags a comprehensive restructuring of the social and political
order throughout the West, even shaping the way we look at the individual, not
primarily as a carrier of rights, as in the liberal tradition, but as an economically
fungible carrier of “human capital” (first observed by Michel Foucault [2008], and
brilliantly updated by Wendy Brown [2015]).
Because neoliberalism is the main ideology undergirding contemporary globaliza-
tion, it must be involved in the making of its opposition, which is populism. However,
with the exception of left-wing populism in southern Europe, which has opposed the
post-financial-crisis austerity policy dictated by the European Union and the IMF,
“neoliberalism” is generally not found as adversary or something to rally against in
the programs of populist parties in Europe. Nor can it be found in the tweets of the one-
18 Gauland, “Warum muss es Populismus sein?”, op. cit.
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time chief-populist in power, Donald Trump, unless it could be turned into nationalist
resentment, against “China” or other predators. American populism, in terms of Trump
and the Tea Party movement that has supported him, is even neoliberal itself, viscerally
rejecting the idea of the state as an instrument of social justice (see Hochschild 2016).
In Europe, populist radical right parties also often have neoliberal roots, as does the
French Front National (originating in old middle-class Poujadisme), the Freiheitliche
(sic!) Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), or most recently the German AfD (which had started as
a professorial anti-Euro platform)—and the most successful Western European populist
party of all, the Swiss People`s Party (SVP), which is Switzerland’s most-voted party for
over 20 years now, even continues to be stoutly neoliberal, being pro-market and anti-state.
The tale of the two liberalisms is thus wrong in depicting populism, at least in its
predominant right-wing version, as self-conscious opposition to “economic liberalism”,
aka neoliberalism. Certainly, most of these parties and movements (with the exception
of the American Tea Party and the Swiss SVP) have in the meantime adopted a pro-
welfare agenda, advocating an ethnically exclusive “welfare chauvinism”.19 They thus
fill in their role as the new working-class parties after the “Third Way” demise of the
left. This turn has been particularly marked in the French Front National (now
Rassemblement National), under the leadership of Marine Le Pen. But in none of the
radical right party programs, including the French, does one find a detailed socioeco-
nomic alternative to the neoliberal hegemony, as astutely observed by Claus Offe
(2019:376). This is much in contrast to these parties` detailed positioning on the
“multicultural” issues of immigration, Islam, or sexual morals.
Even though contemporary right-wing populism may not self-consciously address
and foreground its economic background factors, they are nevertheless operative.
Reviewing a century of “populist revolts” in America and Europe, economic historian
Barry Eichengreen noted that these revolts “rarely arise in good economic times”
(2018:x). Tellingly, at the height of postwar prosperity, the period fondly remembered
in France as the Trentes Glorieuses, there was no populism in Europe and America. Its
rise coincides with the breakup of the postwar class consensus and the rise of neolib-
eralism, first, and globalization, a decade later, the two becoming intricately linked as
the liberation of markets, especially for finance, from territorial state controls. The
sociodemographic basis of Western populism is located between the 75th and 90th
income percentile on economist Branko Milanovic’s famous “elephant curve” (2012),
which shows relative per capita income gains between 1988 and 2008 at all points of
the global income distribution. The people in this bracket, though globally rich, have
seen their net incomes stagnate or even fall in this period, which is the period of
globalization. This global income bracket is mostly filled by the Western lower middle
classes, who are thus the proverbial losers of globalization.
Importantly, the Western lower middle classes are relative losers of globalization,
particularly in comparison with the richest 1% who have seen their income and wealth
explode like perhaps never before in human history. Opponents of an economic
explanation of the rise of right-wing populism in the West point out that it is not the
very poor or the unemployed who typically support such parties or movements, and
instead they point to their strong middle-class support and its cultural anguish.
19 The to date best analysis of (the limits of) ethnically „selective solidarity“ is Koning (2019), which
compares Sweden, Canada, and the Netherlands.
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However, this is beside the point, because—as Tocqueville was the first to notice and
Karl Polanyi also was acutely aware of—a relative loss may be even more painfully
experienced than an absolute loss.
In an important analysis of the US case, Daniel Markovits (2019) correctly notes
that, considering a dramatically declined income-poverty rate over the past half-centu-
ry, from over 40% in 1945 to just under 5 %, economic inequality today is “driven
overwhelmingly not by poverty but by concentrated wealth” (ibid. 102). Previously, the
rupture in American society was between a broad middle to upper class with no clear
distinction between the two (dubbed the “great compression”), on the one hand, and a
great number of poor people, on the other. By contrast, the “new rupture” is between
the “rich” running away from the rest and a middle class whose income gap separating
them from the poor has narrowed: “(T)he poor/middle-class income gap has narrowed
by about a quarter since midcentury, while the middle-class/rich income gap has nearly
doubled” (ibid. 105). In this sense, “rising high-end and falling low-end inequality
occur together” (ibid. 98).
However, Markovits` (2019) main point is not this. Rather, it is that the major
generator and transmitter of growing economic inequality is meritocracy. This helps
explain why neoliberalism is so difficult to oppose, by populists and others, because
meritocratic inequality is ipso facto “just” or “deserved”. In a counterpoint to Thomas
Piketty’s famous claim that the main source of economic inequality today are fast-
growing gains from capital (2014), Markovits argues that the rich are rich because they
work and exploit their own human capital, typically boosted by a degree from an elite
university. In his calculation, “perhaps two-thirds or even three-quarters” of the total
income of the top 1 % of earners in the US is drawn from “their labor and therefore…
their education” (2019:13). However, unlike in Michael Young’s famous fable that had
invented the very word “meritocracy” (1959), this is not a natural meritocracy, based on
inborn talent, in Young’s dystopian scenario identified and separated from the rest
shortly after birth. Instead, it is a social meritocracy based on “more and more intense
cultivation of nurtured talent, extending longer and longer” (Markovits 2019:259). It is
a “sham” meritocracy that launders pre-existing economic inequality through the
“feedback loops”, on the one side, of dual-career families having become breeding
sites of human capital and, on the other side, of technological workplace innovations
being made by and mainly for the “superordinate working class”; as a result of the
latter, there are only “gloomy” or “glossy” jobs, while middle-tier jobs are about to
disappear (for the new “gig” or “platform” economy that shows exactly this dual and
polarized job profile, see also Crouch 2019).
The middle class, this is Markovits` (2019) somber message, is categorically
excluded from the self-reproductive and closed meritocracy of the rich, in which money
is converted into skills and skills are converted back into more money. For Markovits,
the meritocratic regime is a variant of the “resource curse” breeding autocratic elite rule,
which previously had been associated with the oil-rich “rentier states” of the Middle
East. The resource curse works much the same with human capital: “The feedback
loops between exclusive education and skill-based innovation entrench and expand the
elite’s privilege and shrink and marginalize the middle class” (ibid. 257).
In Young’s fable (1959), meritocracy falls in a bloody upheaval by “populists”—
what remarkable foresight! However, it is not quite clear how this upheaval is possible
because, by Young’s own argument, the devious power of meritocracy, where social
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position mirrors individual desert, is to deprive the lower classes of “a distinctive
ideology in conflict with the ethos of society” (ibid. 124): “For the first time in human
history the inferior man has no ready buttress for his self-regard” (ibid. 108). The same
paradox permeates Markovits` real-world account (2019: ch.3). According to it, mer-
itocracy does breed a new “class war”, as is to be expected in a situation of “compre-
hensively isolated social classes”, coexisting on the same territory like Disraeli’s “two
nations” in Victorian England. But it is a “class war” that does not dare to speak its
name, because the very class nature of meritocracy is systematically concealed. Those
who lose out, as Markovits sharply observes, are “victims without a language of
victimhood” (ibid. 63). Accordingly, while sparing the meritocracy principle itself,
the losers get high on meritocracy’s rejection of ascriptive discrimination. A meritoc-
racy, one must know, is naturally inclusive of immigrants and other minorities—they,
more than any other group, prove that you can make it against the odds. Accordingly, a
meritocracy is “excessively sensitive to…prejudice that has no meritocratic gloss—
based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexuality” (ibid. 60); this is a “cardinal and
unforgivable sin that must be suppressed absolutely and without regard for the cost”
(ibid.). In a nutshell, “the meritocratic fixation on diversity and inclusion channels the
anger into nativist, sexist identity politics” (ibid. 64). The losing “majority” copies the
language of the “minorities” who are courted by meritocracy: “Rising nativist asser-
tions of white, male, heterosexual, or Christian identities…follow inexorably from
meritocratic inequality’s economic structure and ideological limitation” (ibid. 63).
But then we are in the domain of culture and identity politics, away from the economic
inequalities that are still the root cause of the underlying resentment. Factoring in
meritocracy allows us to explain how and why economic grievance becomes articulated
in cultural terms, which is a central feature of right-wing populism in the West. This
realistically supplants an earlier version of cultural backlash politics by or on behalf of
disadvantaged whites, which had rallied around the claim of “reverse discrimination”
constituted by minority-privileging affirmative action (the main claim by Allan Bakke,
a white male, in the famous 1978 Supreme Court named after him). This earlier
backlash had still, if only implicitly, defended classic meritocratic principles like
standardized admissions tests for college and universities, also as more adequate path
for minority “assimilation”.20
When fleshing out the “selective moralism” of meritocracy’s disdain for discrimina-
tion, Markovits (2019:61) further observes that “(p)olitical correctness does not denounce
calling rural communities `backward`, southerners `rednecks`, Appalachians `white
trash`, and the bulk of the United States `flyover country`”.21 Importantly, the disparaging
signifiers all point to place-based identities. This is yet another reason why the economic
bases of populism often go misrecognized: the economic inequalities generated by
globalization are inherently connected to place. Globalization privileges cities, because
human capital only flourishes when put to work in proximity to its own kind (see Florida
2003). In turn, human capital is being serviced by a predominantly immigrant underclass,
which yields the “sand hour” stratification typical of “global cities” (see Sassen 1991).
20 This earlier backlash was conjoined by an (auto-)critique of minority assimilation impaired by a group-
mongering “ethos of entitlement”, fed by measures like bilingual education, affirmative action, and minority
set-asides in federal contracts. See Chavez (1991).
21 As one can read in the introduction of J.D. Vance’s memoir, Hillbilly Elegy (2016): “Americans call them
hillbillies, rednecks, or white trash. I call them neighbors, friends and family.“
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The combined effect of globalization is to disadvantage the countryside, so that resent-
ment against it must be concentrated there (see Cramer 2016).
In a global survey of populist revolts in developing and developed countries, from
Thailand to France, economic geographer Andrés Rodriguez-Pose (2017) has pointed
out that not “interpersonal inequality”, as highlighted in the celebrated work of Thomas
Piketty (2014), but “territorial inequality” has been key to all of these revolts. Populism
is “revenge of the `places that don’t matter`” (Rodriguez-Pose 2017:5): “Populist votes
have been heavily concentrated in territories that have suffered long-term declines and
reflect an increasing urban/regional divide” (ibid. 18). The evidence for this abounds.
The Brexit vote was concentrated in industrial and disadvantaged rural areas of the
North and East of England; Lincolnshire, the county with the highest share of the Brexit
vote, has been among the areas with the lowest GDP growth over the past quarter
century.22 And Trump won due to tiny margins in traditionally Democrat “rustbelt
states” like Ohio and Pennsylvania. But even here, big cities, like Pittsburgh and
Cleveland, all went for his Democratic opponent. It is thus the combination of “rustbelt
and flyover country” that breeds populism. In France, it is much the same story. In none
of its big cities did Le Pen win the largest share of the presidential votes in 2017.
Instead, she prevailed in medium-sized and small cities and rural areas of the French
rustbelt in the North and North-East, like Champagne-Ardenne, Franche-Comté, Lor-
raine, Nord-Pas-de-Calais (now including the Picardie). And also here the larger cities,
like Metz, Nancy, Reims, and Lille (in the second election round) went for her non-
populist contender, Emmanuel Macron’s En Marche. Again, the combination of
“rustbelt and flyover country” is decisive. Hence the strong middle-class component
in populist parties and movements, which consists of the provincial bourgeoisies that
have not yet actually lost out but are in fear of losing out under globalization.23 In sum,
an increasingly place-based inequality under contemporary globalization is yet another
factor that hides from view the economic underpinnings of populism.
Populism v. multiculturalism?
In the tale of the double liberalism, populism is as categorically opposed to multiculturalism
as it is opposed to neoliberalism. We qualified this with respect to neoliberalism, which
operates a tergo but is rarely (if at all) subjectively apprehended as the enemy to beat.
Because contemporary right-wing populism mainly addresses cultural issues and appears in
the form of nativism and nationalism, its self-conscious opposition to multiculturalism is
much more obvious. Some have even argued that opposition to multiculturalism is consti-
tutive of populism. Francis Fukuyama (2018:118), most prominently, has argued that
multicultural identity politics has “stimulated the rise of identity politics on the right”, and
he identified two plausible mechanisms for this connection. The first is that multicultural
identity politics gives rise to “political correctness, opposition to which has become a major
22 Philip Manow’s (2018:130) “economic geography of populism“ confirms that the June 2016 pro-Brexit
votes were concentrated in “backward“ regions.
23 Representative for many analyses, see Bergmann et al. (2017), who wittily describe the German AfD, which
is strongest in the provincial east of Germany, as the party of “(sich) a usgeliefert fühlende
Durchschnittsverdiener” (average earners who feel victimized)—note that the first letters in German yield
the acronym AfD.
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source of mobilization on the right” (ibid.). And the second is that the “idea that my
particular group is being victimized” (ibid. 122) can be easily adopted by majority groups,
not least due to their demographically and politically imperiled situation in many Western
immigrant societies (for evidence, see Orgad 2015: ch.1 and 2).
However, calling both multiculturalism and populism a “politics of identity”, also
suggests some communalities that merit further attention. First it needs to be
underscored that populism is best understood as “political style” (Moffitt and Tormey
2014) or “stylistic repertoire” (Brubaker 2017:363), because it can be filled with a
variety of political content, right or left, nationalist or socialist. Against this backdrop,
populism in the West today is mainly (but not exclusively) of the right-wing and the
nationalist kind. Yet, if one probes deeper into the nature of this nationalism, it
resembles in many ways the multiculturalism that is notionally opposed by it.
To the degree that there is a coherent doctrine underlying nationalist popu-
lism, it resembles what the French New Right intellectual, Alain de Benoist,
has called “ethnopluralism”. This doctrine, which has been highly influential in
radical right circles, also outside France, is akin to a groupist, non-liberal
version of multiculturalism. One could call it multiculturalism appropriated by
the majority group. Ethnopluralism’s main tenet is the “equivalency of homog-
enous peoples in their indigenous territories” (De Benoist, quoted by Weiss
2017: ch.1). Importantly, it notionally repudiates “racism” because of the
latter’s rejection of human variety and hierarchizing of races (De Benoist
2017:56, 86). However, ethnopluralism shares with classic racism its anti-
individualism, the unconditional subsuming of the individual and of her capac-
ities and character to the presumed features of the origin group; and it shares
with racism the assumption that, for the sake of purity, a mixing of ethnic or
racial groups is to be avoided at all cost. Yet, and here the similarity with
multiculturalism kicks in, ethnopluralism differs from classic racism in shifting
the basis of ethnicity or race from biology to culture, and in eschewing the
notion of a hierarchy of groups in favor of their equality—the New Right
endorses the “variety” of the world’s cultures and of the groups that carry them
(ibid. 30). This sounds much like multiculturalism, at least a group-
essentializing variant of it. The rightist element shows in the axiomatic rejection
of egalitarianism in favor of inequality and hierarchy, which self-defines the
New Right qua “Right”. The resulting stance is inconsistent and contradictory
because inequality is repudiated between groups while it is endorsed within
groups.
Ethnopluralism’s key assumption is the denial of shared humanity in favor of
prior group membership. This yields a right-wing version of radical multicul-
turalism whose group-protecting point of reference is not minorities but the
majority (see Spektorowski 2003). Ethnopluralism, in fact, explicitly borrows
from multiculturalism the “right to difference”, but it moves its point of
reference from minorities to the majority and thus turns the right to difference
into the rejection of intra-state diversity, in the extreme, into the call for
ejecting the minorities. Of course, Algerian or Moroccan-origin Muslims have
the right to be different, but only in their own territories. Similarly, the answer
to “Black Power” is “White Power”. De Benoist, (2017:103) calls it “mutual
decolonization”: “What is good for the Bororos or the Guaqaquis should…also
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be good for us…Let us affirm the right of peoples to be just themselves; the
right of all peoples to fully develop themselves, against any kind of universal-
ism and against all racisms.”24
An admirably iconoclastic proposal to bridge the majority-minority divide, not in
rightist- but leftist-multiculturalist terms, has been made by Eric Kaufmann (2018:1).
He argues in favor of a “symmetrical multiculturalism” in which “white identity” is
recognized and protected as “an ethnic identity like any other”. It is premised on the ultra-
liberal idea of a strictly neutral state, not claimable by a majority, but which “de-center(s)
itself from the ethnic majority and treat(s) it as just another stakeholder” (ibid. 524).
The problem with a majority-inclusive, “symmetrical multiculturalism” is the as-
sumption that “white” or “majority” identity could be like any other identity, adjudi-
cated by a neutral state that “doesn’t play favourites, but must carry out its duty to
represent the cultural interests of its stakeholder communities” (Kaufmann 2018:523).
One wonders: who would run this state from nowhere, a new “gelded” elite, to assure
impartiality (as known in some agrarian societies, see Gellner 1981:14–5)?25
The question is: can there be a legitimate “white identity” politics, as is Kaufmann’s
(2018) claim? Another way of posing the question is to ask whether the “myths of
descent, symbols and traditions”, which is Kaufmann’s (ibid. 1) description of the
content of “ethnic identity”, could ever be innocent, that is, non-racist, in the particular
case of “white”. It is difficult to come up with an affirmative answer. Kaufmann slights
the distinction between racial and ethnic. “White” is a racial, not ethnic marker. If we
follow Max Weber’s (1976:234) classic understanding of “race membership”, it is
primarily defined by a negative demarcation from the “conspicuously different”
(auffällig Andersgeartete). Unlike ethnicity, Weber seems to suggest, race is not in
the first a positive and self-defined marker, but it is always pejorative and a discrim-
inatory intention by others is constitutive of it. The matter is further complicated by the
fact that “whites” have been on the beneficiary end of a racial hierarchy that it itself has
brought into existence, at great cost to the other “races”.
That a positive and non-discriminatory “white identity” is nevertheless possible, is
the provocative empirical claim of a recent survey analysis of the United States (Jardina
2019). The Trump phenomenon, indeed, has usually been explained in terms of “white
identity politics”, though in the standardly negative and discriminatory variant. On the
contrary, Duke sociologist Ashley Jardina suggests, “(m)any whites identify with their
racial group, without feeling prejudice toward racial and ethnic minorities” (ibid. 5).
According to her in-depth analysis of a broad swathe of opinion data, 30–40% of the
white population in the US is “high on racial solidarity”, but the “vast majority” of
24 See also Rogers Brubaker (2001:536), discussing the French historian and philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff’s
analysis of the French New Right, whose “differentialist” discourse was adopted by Le Pen’s National Front:
“(F)ormally `heterophile ,̀ antiracist, and egalitarian, the new differentialists of the right emphasized, indeed absolut-
ized, cultural difference...`Droit à la différence? Mais oui, bien sûr, chez vous .̀ But here, in France—so went the
argument—it’s we, the ` real` French, who have their own right to be different…”
25 This problem also mars Alan Patten’s (2014) attempt to find the “moral foundations” of multicultural
minority rights in the idea of a perfectly neutral state. Kymlicka (1995) is more realistic in this respect, arguing
that, in matters of national majority culture, “benign neglect” is not possible, thus advocating the co-existence
of liberal nationalism and liberal multiculturalism. That “benign neglect” may not even be possible in matters
of religion, which was still assumed by Kymlicka (1995), is argued, in starkly exaggerated fashion in my view,
by “critical secularism” studies in the mold of Talal Asad (most incisively, Mahmood 2016; for a critique, see
Joppke 2017b).
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them also “reject white supremacy and racism” (ibid. 8). These positive race identifiers,
she argues, simply favor policies that are in their group interest, like social security,
Medicare, or legacy college admissions.26 At the same time, these whites are indifferent
and not hostile to minority-favoring policies like affirmative action or Medicaid (ibid.
ch.7). Jardina concludes that “we must…think about white identity in the way we think
of black identity” (ibid. 34), or of any group identity studied within social-
psychological “social identity theory”. “Racial identity” is simply “a conscious
favoritism for one’s in-group and recognition that one’s group has shared
interests” (ibid. 47–8).
Somewhat dissonant with this assumption of a basic symmetry between minority
and majority identities, which she shares with Kaufmann (2018), is Jardina’s unavoid-
able concession that in the case of “whites” we are dealing with “dominant group
identity”, which is actualized by the realistic “threat” of becoming a numerical minority
by mid-century (2019:42). If one probes further into this “dominance”, “white” imme-
diately loses its innocence and it can no longer be just another “group identity”. One
would have to be amnesic about the problematic past of “whites” as America’s
Herrenrasse (master race), reigning and protecting itself through Jim Crow segregation
and racially discriminatory immigration policies well into the mid-twentieth century, to
find dignity in it today. Moreover, the very fact that “so many white Americans (were)
drawn to a candidate like Donald Trump, who was often derisive of racial and ethnic
minorities” (ibid. 3), suggests that the boundaries between in-group favoritism and out-
group hostility must be more porous than Jardina would have it.
In sum, while both minority and majority may dwell in “identity politics”, the
attempts to reconcile them within a symmetrical multiculturalism (Kaufmann 2018)
or within an ordinary ethnic politics paradigm (Jardina 2019), must fail.
Doubts, and where to go from there
The tale of the double liberalism, neoliberal and multicultural in tandem, which is
countered by the Fundamentalopposition of right-wing populism, is a widely shared
diagnosis of the contemporary political divide in the West, closely overlapping with the
assumption that “open v. closed” is overlaying and modifying the old “left v. right”
cleavage.
As this paper tried to demonstrate, the relationship between the constitutive elements
of this scenario: populism, neoliberalism, and multiculturalism, is less clear-cut and
more intricate than first meets the eye. The core assumption of the double liberalism
tale, that there is an alliance of sorts between neoliberalism and multiculturalism, is on
shaky grounds. Apart from the problem that the “liberalism” pedigree of neoliberalism
is questionable, only a thin version of multiculturalism, in terms of diversity and
antidiscrimination, is compatible with a neoliberalism whose defining mark is an
austere individualism and rejection of the idea of social justice. With respect to the
26 As Rogers Brubaker remarked in a commentary on a previous draft of this paper, the beneficiaries of Social
Security and Medicare certainly are not exclusively “whites“, while legacy college admissions should be in the
interest of only a small portion of them. To Jardina’s defense, she only looks at what is perceived by and not
what is in the interest of “whites”.
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stipulated opposition between populism and neoliberalism, there seems to be an
objective conditioning of populism by the widening wealth gap and the creeping
middle-class erosion that go along with neoliberalism. This neoliberalism and its
economic bases, however, tend not to be apprehended and addressed by populist
actors. Instead, cultural issues, in particular, the vindication of majority culture over
that of the minorities, centrally preoccupy the latter. Accordingly, the stipulated
opposition of populism to multiculturalism is on firmer ground. However, there are
subterraneous communalities between the populists` nationalism and multiculturalism,
which I tried to demonstrate in the discussion of “ethnopluralism” and of “white
identity politics”. These communalities still don’t warrant the construct of a majority-
inclusive, symmetrical multiculturalism or application of an ordinary ethnic politics
paradigm.
All three central terms of this paper: populism, neoliberalism, and multiculturalism,
are problematic because they are not just “categories of analysis” but, and primarily,
“categories of practice” (Brubaker 2012), and heavily polemicized practical categories
at that. The notions of “populism” and “neoliberalism” have in common to be mostly
external designations by theorists or political actors who dislike both; self-designated
“populists” or “neoliberals” are thin on the ground. Similar problems plague the
concept of “multiculturalism”, the perhaps most enigmatic of the three, which Stuart
Hall once called “maddeningly spongy and imprecise” (quoted in Koopmans
2013:148). Vagueness and indeterminacy reigns whenever the term is used, in the
world of practice even more than in the world of theory. For the world of practice, just
consider the EU. On the website of the European Commission’s Migration and Home
Affairs Unit,27 one finds this definition of “multiculturalism”: “A policy that endorses
the principle of cultural diversity and supports the right of different cultural and ethnic
groups to retain distinctive cultural identities ensuring their equitable access to society,
encompassing constitutional principles and commonly shared values prevailing in the
society.” This is a notably friendly because liberal-inclusive definition of multicultur-
alism, which closely aligns it with “constitutional principles” and “shared values”—
what is exactly denied by those opposed to it, from some liberals to populists. But then,
under “synonym(s)”, the EU document lists “interculturalism”. This is arguably wrong,
because this concept has evolved as a centrist critique of an allegedly difference-
mongering multiculturalism (see Zapata-Barrero 2017). And, under “related term(s)”,
there is “cultural diversity”. This is at best a half-truth, as I tried to show above. Finally,
under “note(s)”, the EU document mentions that “(m)ulticulturalism emphasizes cul-
tural differences…without necessarily much contact or…interaction”. This is the stan-
dard charge of “interculturalism”, which thus cannot simply be a “synonym” of
multiculturalism. This pejorative description of multiculturalism also contradicts the
same document’s initial liberal-inclusive definition of multiculturalism. One sees,
confusion reigns, and probably not only in the European Commission.
If the internal meaning of our key concepts is indeterminate, also depending on
which other concept(s) and aspects thereof they are paired with, so must be their
relationships. The notions of “allies” and “opposition”, which I used for describing
the relationship between populism and the two liberalisms, suggest stance-taking by
27 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/
multiculturalism_en
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concrete socio-political actors, and whenever possible I tried to identify them—such as
Third Way leftist parties as typical platform for the “alliance” between multiculturalism
and neoliberalism, and radical right parties as typical “opposition” to the two. It is the
translation of conceptual-level Wahlverwandtschaften (elective affinities), to use Max
Weber’s enigmatic term, or of frictions and incompatibilities at this level, into the
concrete reality of socio-political actors and organizations, which is the biggest chal-
lenge for future work.
Just take the central assumption of an “alliance” between the two liberalisms. What does
it mean exactly? This needs further exploration. Nancy Fraser’s “progressive neoliberalism”
(2017) suggests that such “alliance” is concretely accomplished in the post-1990s Demo-
cratic Party in the US. But hers is merely a cursory sketch that was never fully worked out
(but see Frank 2016), nor has it been applied to, or systematically compared with, other
countries and political systems. The most complete version of the double liberalism tale, by
Andreas Reckwitz (2017 and 2019), actually speaks less in terms of “alliance” than of
“political paradigm”, which is at a higher level of abstraction, allowing for both alliance and
opposition under the same umbrella. Importantly, in the new paradigm of the “liberalism of
openness” (apertistischer Liberalismus), which is said to have replaced the old paradigm of
“social corporatism”, the left-right distinction is still operative, as “left liberalism” (or
“cultural liberalism”) pitted against “economic liberalism” on the right (2019:251). Accord-
ingly, the “liberalism of openness” is a “synthesis of twowings (Flügel) of a new liberalism,
of which one is right, the other left of the center” (ibid. 261). As a result, “at the level of
actors” (Akteursebene), these “wings often distrust one another” (ibid. 262). At the same
time, Reckwitz sees both poles of the new paradigm united, not somuch in terms of political
party than of social class: the “central carrier group” of the “liberalism of openness” is said to
be the “new middle class of the highly qualified, who are concentrated in metropolitan
regions and marked by high spatial mobility” (ibid.)—note that the German populist
Gauland’s notion of “new urban elite” (2018) had the exact same ring. Reckwitz’s new
middle class is “in some parts more neoliberally, in others more left-liberally oriented;
partially it is also both together” (2019:262). What unites this class is not least its “common
opponent”, which at the level of “political paradigms” is “the now apparently rigid, freedom-
quashing and collectivist paradigm of social corporatism” (ibid.)—and at the level of actors
and organizations, are the populists and their radical right parties.
As if life imitates art, not only one of Germany’s leading populists, but also one of the
country’s Green Party leaders, Robert Habeck, seems to have taken his perception of current
sociopolitical realities from the pages of Andreas Reckwitz (even quoting him in a recent
book, Habeck 2021). Habeck depicts himself and his Green Party as representatives of the
“individualistic, liberal, and cosmopolitan milieu, geared toward authenticity
(Selbstverwirklichung) and the good life, which has acquired cultural hegemony in the past
few decades” (ibid. 322). Now the challenge, in his view, is the forging of a new “normative
center” (ibid. 318), a “new culture of communality (Gemeinsamkeit)” (ibid. 315) to
overcome the populism-infested “politics of polarization” (ibid. 323). Down to the formu-
lation, this also mirrors Reckwitz’s diagnosis that in an age of economically and culturally
fired “singularities”, there is the need for the “constitution of something in society that is
shared by all” (Konstitution eines gesellschaftlichenAllgemeinen) (2019:290). For theGreen
politician, the professed preoccupation with “all of society” (das gesellschaftliche Ganze)
(Habeck 2021:322) and hope for a “new societal center” (ibid. 315), is a thinly concealed
coalition offer to the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the German federal
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election year 2021, as sociologist Stephan Lessenich suspects in a sarcastic review (2021).
Never naming the CDU, which despite its being a Volkspartei (catch-all party) is still the
main platform of Germany’s business interests (especially of the entrepreneurial
Mittelstand), Habeck depicts his Greens as inherently an “alliance party” (Bündnispartei),
and “alliance means by definition that people of different views, background, and milieu
work together” (Habeck 2021: 326). In fact, in the process of becoming Germany’s second-
strongest party, after the CDU, the Greens have long shed their previous anti-capitalist
edges, and they now appraise (ecologically and socially tamed) markets as “powerful
instruments of economic efficiency, innovation and technological progress” (Bündnis 90-
The Greens 2020:19). At the same time, of course, the party of “trans” and of other
multicultural things, the Greens by themselves are the “double liberalism” on legs, which
would merely be doubled-down by the Green-Black coalition that may well be the next
government of Germany. The Green-Black “new center” (Habeck), which might inherit the
current Red-Black (SPD-CDU) coalition in swallowing the old left v. right distinction, will
guarantee that populism will not disappear anytime soon.
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